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Introduction 
The production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs represent a major global phenomenon.  
Alongside the damage this causes to individuals and societies, drugs are also perceived to be 
a major cause of sustained violent conflict and state fragility.  Despite concerted efforts to 
reduce drug production and trafficking, western counter-narcotic strategies have largely been 
a failure.  The global drugs trade continues to flourish and the US-led War on Drugs has 
caused substantial perverse results (Jelsma & Kramer 2005; McCoy 2004; Tullis 1995; Van 
der Veen 2002).1 In the decade since the 1998 UN General Assembly Special Session on 
Drugs, which set 2008 as the date by which states should seek to “eliminate or significantly 
reduce the illicit manufacture, marketing and trafficking” (UN 1998) of drugs, global opium 
production grew by a staggering 78% (UNODC 2010c, 12).  Over the past three decades the 
2010 World Drug Report concedes that “global opium production and global coca production 
have grown by a factor of 6 (cocaine) and 7 (opium) during the last three decades” (UNODC 
2010c, 1).      
 
A major reason why western counter-narcotics strategies have enjoyed such little success is 
their poor understanding of and engagement with local politics in source countries, in 
particular the ways in which the drug trade has become embedded within broader processes 
of state-building and economic transformation.  The starting point for such analysis is a 
political economy approach which places commodities in their social and political context 
and focuses explicitly on the “politics of production” surrounding resources (Nevins and Lee 
Peluso 2008, 2).  
 
This study seeks to address this weakness through a detailed analysis of the political economy 
of the drug trade in Shan State, Eastern Burma, which is the source of 90% of Southeast 
Asia’s opium and home to a vastly expanding production of amphetamine-type stimulants 
(ATS), during the period 1988-2010.  It begins with a brief overview of developments in 
Shan State over the past two decades, emphasizing how the history of drugs in the region is 
one of intense interconnection, in which the drug trade has been perpetually embroiled in 
wider questions surrounding the autonomy of borderland populations and the distribution of 
power within these regions.  The second section provides a brief analysis of mainstream 
interpretations of the relationship between drugs, conflict and state capacity which have 
                                                          
1 Criticism of the War on Drugs has concentrated on two main issues; firstly, the failure of western counter-
narcotics agencies to understand the economics of the global drug trade, and secondly the huge social costs in 
both source and consumer countries of strict prohibition policies.  Many critics have emphasized that by 
attempting to enforce crop eradication in source countries whilst failing to address demand for drugs in the west 
counter-narcotics policies have inadvertently managed to increase the ‘risk premium’ and thus the profitability 
of the drug trade, increase the volume of drugs produced by pushing cultivation into new areas beyond the reach 
of enforcement agencies (the ‘balloon effect’), and intensify the violence surrounding the trade which in turn has 
caused the cost of drug enforcement to rise astronomically 
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underpinned global counter-narcotics strategies, emphasizing their limitations and making the 
case for an alternative approach which focuses specifically on the interrelationship between 
the drug trade and processes of state-building and agrarian change in Burma’s borderlands.  
The third section analyses the specific ways in which the drug trade in Shan State has become 
embroiled in the dynamics of coercion, opposition and brokerage surrounding these 
processes.  In doing so, it suggests how such ‘bottom-up’ approaches offer new insights into 
the challenges facing global governance strategies surrounding the drug trade at a time when 
disillusionment with the War on Drugs continues to grow.  These findings are outlined in the 
fourth and final section.     
 
Drugs and state-building in Burma’s eastern borderlands: 1988-2012 
In 1988, following decades of economic mismanagement and oppressive military rule, 
widespread protests engulfed much of Burma, centred on Rangoon.  Following the brutal 
repression of these protests the new military government, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC; renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 
1997), announced there would be free and fair elections.  After the landslide victory of Aung 
San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), the SLORC ignored the election 
results, and instead sought to re-build its control across the country.   
 
In many ways the late 1980s marked a nadir of state authority in Burma; insurgency remained 
rife throughout the country's borderlands despite decades of brutal counterinsurgency 
offensives, there remained widespread discontent against the government, and the state was 
close to bankruptcy, a fact further exacerbated by international sanctions against the country.  
However, new opportunities for the state's rebuilding agenda were also emerging.  Within 
months of the state’s brutal repression of the pro-democracy demonstrations, the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB), Burma’s largest insurgency group, collapsed and divided into four 
separate armies, mainly along ethnic lines, namely the United Wa State Army (UWSA) 
located in the Wa Hills, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) which 
controlled the Kokang area of Shan State, the Shan State Army-East (SSA-E) and the New 
Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) based close to the Chinese border in Kachin State 
(Lintner 1990).2   
 
Alongside the disarray caused by the CPB’s collapse, the changing attitude of Burma’s 
neighbours also strengthened the SLORC’s state-building agenda.  Under Deng Xiaoping, 
Chinese patronage of the CPB was terminated as China increasingly began to view Burma as 
a potentially useful economic ally.  The country’s vast natural resources became highly 
coveted commodities to fuel China’s ongoing industrialization, whilst increasing cross-border 
trade was viewed as a cost-effective way to ameliorate the country’s coast-interior divide by 
stimulating economic development in land-locked Yunnan Province.  In Thailand the 
emergence of a powerful business class altered domestic power relations, forcing the military, 
which had often viewed the presence of insurgency groups on the Thai-Burma border as a 
useful buffer against the activities of the Burmese Army, to acquiesce to the demands of 
                                                          
2 The CPB, founded in 1939, was one of the first political parties to go underground (in 1948) in opposition to 
the Burmese government. Throughout its history it remained deeply committed to Maoist principles and the 
party received financial and military support from China from the mid-1960s until Mao’s death (Lintner 1990). 
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political and business leaders determined to improve economic relations with Burma (Myint-
U 2006, 287, 308; Renard 1996, 108). 
 
In response to these challenges and opportunities the SLORC launched a period of extensive 
state re-building in which for both political and economic reasons control over the country’s 
borderland areas became increasingly important to the state’s survival and development 
(Callahan 2007a, 17).   Fears of an alliance between pro-democracy protestors fleeing central 
Burma and well-armed insurgent groups gave renewed urgency to the state’s efforts to assert 
more direct control over the country’s borderlands, whilst the government also realized that 
such control would allow it to capitalize on growing Chinese and Thai demand for the 
country’s natural resources.   
 
Reversing its decades-long policy of seeking a purely military solution to the insurgency it 
faced, the government entered into ceasefire agreements, initially with the four CPB splinter 
groups.  By 1995 the government had signed agreements with nineteen insurgent groups 
(Meehan 2011, 388-9).  In return for a cessation of hostilities and a promise to sever all ties 
with other insurgent groups the state appeared to grant ceasefire groups unofficial permission 
to pursue whatever business ventures they wished, the promise of economic development 
assistance, and entry into the National Convention to draft the country’s new constitution. 
The ceasefire agreements did not seek to tackle the more intractable political issues 
surrounding the future status of the country’s ethnic minority regions, and instead created a 
“kind of post-civil-war-not-quite-peace environment” (Callahan 2007a, xiv; TNI 2009a).3   
 
Within this tense environment, however, the state has gained far greater control over both 
cross-border trade with China and Thailand and the exploitation of natural resources in the 
country’s borderlands, predominantly through the establishment of state-private partnerships 
with both Burmese and foreign (especially Chinese) companies (Woods 2011a; MacLean 
2008; TNI 2012).4  Within Shan State there has been a vast expansion of cash crop 
production, primarily rubber, but also tea, sugarcane and cassava (TNI 2012, 40-44), mineral 
extraction, including coal, iron, tin and precious gems (rubies and sapphires), and plans for 
electricity generation through the construction of numerous hydropower dams on the Salween 
and Shweli rivers.   
 
Alongside these profound economic developments the government has recorded some of its 
most significant counter-insurgency ‘victories’ of the past fifty years and the state’s 
                                                          
3 The situation created by the ceasefires was by no means homogeneous. Some groups have refused to sign 
ceasefires, notably the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), and the 
ceasefires themselves have provided former insurgent groups with varying degrees of local autonomy. The level 
of autonomy granted by the state appeared to be determined by three factors. Ceasefires signed in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, when the state was at its weakest, saw insurgent groups derive greater concessions than those 
signed later in the 1990s. Insurgent groups in control of regions with extensive natural resources have also 
enjoyed far greater bargaining power in their dealings with the state. Finally, those groups with powerful armies 
gained greater concessions as the state sought to avoid violent confrontation.  
4 Between 2001 and 2007 the volume of Burmese exports to China grew by 2.5 times to a value of US$555, 
with Chinese imports increasing threefold over the same period (Kudo 2008, 96-97). Although illegal cross-
border trade most likely continues to parallel the growth in formal trade, the state’s revenue from custom duties 
nevertheless rose by more than 500 per cent in 2005 and rose again in 2006 (Turnell 2008, 113).  
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consolidation of power in Shan State appears to have become greater than at any time since 
independence.  Joint offensives by the Burma Army and ceasefire groups such as the UWSA 
have vastly reduced the area of territory controlled by insurgency groups which refused to 
sign ceasefires, notably the Shan State Army South (SSA-S).  In recent years the Army has 
also put increasing pressure on ceasefire groups that have rejected government attempts to 
curtail their autonomy, routing the MNDAA headquarters in Kokang in August 2009 (which 
resulted in some 40,000 refugees fleeing into China) and mounting offensives against the 
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) over the past year.   
 
Throughout this period of state re-building in the borderlands, Burma’s drug production, with 
its epicentre in Shan State, took off on an unprecedented scale (Meehan 2011, 382-3). 
According to US government figures, opium levels rose from 836 to 2,340 tons between 1987 
and 1995, with the area under cultivation expanding from 92,300 hectares in 1987 to 154,000 
hectares in 1995 (Linter 2000, 15). The number of heroin refineries within Burma rapidly 
multiplied and a new network of drug-trading routes into China and India emerged (Ko Lin 
Chin 2009, 88-9).  Although opium cultivation declined markedly in the late 1990s, the 
success of eradication efforts has been short-lived. Initial reduction was offset by a rapid rise 
in the production of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), an enterprise which is more 
footloose, less weather dependent and has an expanding market within Southeast Asia. 
Burma has rapidly become one of the world’s leading producers of ATS and a major supplier 
to the growing market in China and Thailand (ALTSEAN-Burma 2006, 52-66; Ko Lin Chin 
2009, 129-31).  In 2009 alone, 93 million ATS pills were seized across China, Thailand and 
Burma (UNODC 2010a, 2). Furthermore, the opium bans launched by the MNDAA in 2002 
and the UWSA in 2005, seemingly in an attempt to overcome their image in the west as 
‘narco-armies’ and gain greater international support for their own state-building efforts, 
appear to have become unsustainable (Ko Lin Chin 2009, 242).  In 2010 the Southeast Asian 
Opium Survey recorded that opium cultivation in Burma had risen for the fourth year in a 
row, and had grown by 76 per cent since 2009, causing Burma’s share of world opium 
production to jump from 5 per cent in 2009 to 16 per cent in 2010 (UNODC 2010b, 11). 
Although production levels remain significantly below the peak years of the early 1990s, 
levels of production over the past five years remain similar to those estimated throughout the 
1970s and 1980s (Lintner and Black 2009, 93).   
 
In many ways the Burmese government’s willingness to hold elections in November 2010 
and offer limited, but significant political reforms in the period since the election appears to 
be a reflection of the government’s growing self-confidence that it is now in a strong enough 
position, both politically and economically, to manage this limited democratic opening in 
such a way that will not threaten its control over the country.  The consolidation of the state’s 
control over the country’s eastern borderlands has been essential to this growing 
assertiveness. 
 
Drugs, conflict and state fragility:  A review of the literature 
The dominant discourse on the political economy of illicit drugs has been underpinned by 
two inter-related arguments; firstly, that drugs are a major cause of sustained violent conflict, 
and secondly that they play a fundamental role in increasing state fragility.  
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Drugs and conflict 
The drugs-conflict nexus emerged out of a wider body of literature in the 1990s that was 
interested in why the end of the Cold War had failed to deliver a prolonged peace dividend 
and what factors continued to drive war (predominantly intra-state war) in the Global South 
following the decline of Cold War superpower patronage.  This literature focused specifically 
on the economic dimensions of war, especially their self-financing nature (Hirshleifer 1995, 
2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005; Collier 2000; Berdal 
and Malone 2000; Keen 1998; Grossman 1991).  Following the influential work of Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998; Collier et al 2003) growing attention has focused on the 
relationship between resource abundance and violent conflict. Violence has been 
conceptualised as rent-seeking predation, with the plunder of natural resources being 
understood as the underlying driving force in most contemporary civil wars.   
 
Drugs have been considered an especially conflict-prone resource for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, they are an inherently lootable resource; they can be extracted by individuals or small 
groups without the use of expensive equipment and can be easily smuggled, preventing states 
from monopolising production or preventing extraction (Ross 2004; Lujala et al 2005, 539; 
Snyder 2005).  Such lootability also allows rebel leaders to provide credible material 
incentives for fighting, increasing soldier recruitment and solving the problem of collection 
action.  Secondly, the illicit nature of drugs is also presumed to make them especially 
predisposed to conflict (Cornell 2005).  A thriving drug economy is deemed to require the 
creation of ungoverned spaces based on the presumption that greater state control would 
entail a clamp down on illegal activities and might lead to interference with cross-border 
networks to lucrative foreign markets.  These arguments were epitomised most clearly in the 
UNODC 2010 World Drug Report which argued that, 
 
Large-scale opium poppy cultivation requires large land areas, and is a highly 
labour-intensive activity. To generate the heroin needed to satisfy global 
demand, thousands of hectares and hundreds of thousands of workers must be 
employed without state interference, and the best deterrent for state 
interference with this process is a rebel army. Without an active conflict, 
heroin production can be eliminated (UNODC 2010c, 232).   
 
The illicit nature of drugs may make a peaceful resolution harder to achieve because the need 
to maintain legitimacy within the international system is believed to discourage states from 
offering any form of negotiated settlement with rebel groups that could allow them to retain 
some form of control over the drug trade.  As a consequence the opportunity cost of peace 
becomes extremely high for rebel groups involved in drugs, and may discourage them from 
seeking a durable political settlement.  Finally, the risk premium attached to the production 
and trafficking of illicit narcotics make them an especially profitable resource, which is 
perceived to increase the likelihood that the initial grievances of insurgent groups located in 
drug-producing regions may be more easily corrupted (Cornell 2005, 758).  The long-running 
insurgency in Burma and the activities of the FARC in Colombia are often viewed as 
paradigmatic examples of the corruptive capabilities of drug revenues and the challenges this 
poses to establishing a durable peaceful resolution (Cornell 2005; Brown 1999).  
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Drugs and state fragility 
The 1990s also witnessed renewed interest in the role that the state could play as an agent for 
development and a belief that overcoming state fragility in the developing world should be a 
priority for international development agencies.  Illicit economies have been viewed as both a 
sign and a cause of state fragility, embodying a major security threat to the west by creating 
ungoverned spaces in which transnational crime and terrorism could flourish (For example: 
E.U. 2005).  As David Nugent (1999) argues, “illegal networks are usually taken to point to 
the limits of the state...[and]... are generally seen to reflect and/or fill a void in state activities, 
to point to an absence or at least a ‘thin-ness’ in ‘stateness’”(pp.68-9; see also Goodhand 
2008b, 413). 
 
Together these two suppositions have created the dominant perception that drugs have 
contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and ever-weakening state capacity.  A powerful 
symbiotic relationship is thus perceived to exist between counter-narcotics strategies, peace-
building and state-building, with strict law enforcement and drug eradication portrayed as a 
means by which to target the revenue of ‘greedy’ rebels and in doing so strengthen 
government institutions in fragile states. 
 
 
The drugs-conflict-state fragility nexus: A critique 
The ongoing prevalence and diversification of drug production in Shan State over the past 
two decades greatly complicates standard interpretations of the factors fuelling the drug trade, 
especially since the locations where drug cultivation has grown most rapidly since 2006 
appear to be in areas that have come under increasing state control (PWO 2006; TNI 2012).  
The duality of drug production and state consolidation in Burma’s borderlands strongly 
suggests that drugs should no longer be portrayed as existing only in the murky underworld 
of ‘greedy’ rebels, organized crime and terrorists operating in ungoverned spaces beyond the 
reach of the state, and nor should they be viewed as necessarily perpetuating state fragility.  
An alternative conceptual framework is needed, which engages with the “politics of 
production” (Nevins and Lee Peluso 2008, 2) and acknowledges that it is not the presence of 
resources themselves, but the social relations surrounding them that determine the 
relationship between resources, conflict and state capacity (Meehan 2011, 402; van der Veen 
2002, 104; Goodhand 2008b). Such an approach must engage with the complex dynamics of 
state-building and economic transformation within the specific spatial dynamics of 
borderland regions.  Moving beyond simplistic rebel-centric approaches, it is argued that the 
drug trade in Burma’s eastern borderlands is shaped by the motivations and actions of 
multiple actors who engage in a complex and fluctuating mosaic of coercion, counter-
movement and brokerage in response to the processes of state consolidation and economic 
transformation which are profoundly shaping life in these borderlands.   
 
State-building and economic transformation in Burma’s borderlands 
 
State-building and the institutionalization of order 
“Mainstream state talk” (Boege et al 2008, 4) has typically analysed fragility in terms of the 
extent to which state institutions embody or deviate from a set of supposed state norms, 
modelled on the specifically western development trajectory of the classical 
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Weberian/Westphalian state (Midgal 2001, 3-16).5  Such an approach conceptualises the 
model state as a single actor functioning autonomously over society and wielding a monopoly 
over the legitimate use of violence within a clearly defined territorial unit.  The liberal state-
building agenda has sought to overcome state fragility by supplanting western institutions 
which, it is argued, will increase state capacity and allow states in the developing world to 
overcome the threat of violent disorder and economic underdevelopment (Ghani and 
Lockhart 2008).  Within this model of “virtuous state-building” (Giustozzi 2001, 5), the 
perceived correlation between thriving illicit economies and state fragility is primarily 
founded upon a number of implicit “normative dualisms” (Ballve 2011, 10), notably between 
state and non-state actors and licit and illicit activities, which equate the state with law and 
order and relegate illicit activities to the status of a ‘deviant subculture’ (Heyman and Smart 
1999, 19; Meehan 2011, 378;).  This approach, however, is highly problematic as the 
perception that criminal networks mark the frontier of state authority, appear to reflect 
underlying normative assumptions surrounding the ‘correct’ role of the state, rather than an 
accurate empirical analysis of the political economy of illicit commodities in source 
countries, and the role that they play in processes of state-building and state breakdown.  As 
Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause (2002) argue, “concern over the possibility of state failure 
thus often has as much to do with dashed expectations about the achievement of modern 
statehood, or the functions that modern states should fulfil, as it does with the empirically-
observed decomposition or collapse of the institutions of governance in different parts of the 
world” (pp.753-4 ).  
 
Such normative approaches to state-building are unable to account adequately for contexts in 
which the lack of Weberian foundations has not created state fragility or led to state 
breakdown. Between the Kantian/Rawlian virtuous state and the Hobbesian anarchic dystopia 
exists a vast array of functioning state institutions.  A far more interesting and important 
starting point for analysis is how states function in spite of lacking the institutional 
foundations of western states.  This necessitates an engagement with how states actually 
function, rather than how they ought to (Heyman and Smart 1999; Lund 2006, 674).  It 
requires moving beyond the ‘idea’ of the state and instead engaging with its empirical reality 
(Abrams 1988).  
 
In Burma’s drug-producing borderlands, as across large parts of the world, Weberian 
foundations quite simply do not exist.  Instead, Shan State remains embroiled within the 
“brutal politics of sovereignty” (Goodhand 2009, 9).  It contains contending and competing 
centres of legitimacy and public authority and state-like institutions are not managed by a 
single actor (‘the government’) but are controlled by an array of competing social groups.  
There is no central monopoly over the means of violence, which is instead dispersed 
throughout society.  The fundamental question, which lies at the heart of understanding a 
country’s specific development pathway, is how state institutions are constructed and how 
                                                          
5 Migdal (2001) offers a lengthy critique of this approach, arguing that the fixation with Weberian definitions of 
the state offers “no way to theorize about arenas of competing sets of rulers, other than to cast these in the 
negative, as failures or weak states or even non-states.  In short Weber’s ideal state when taken as the normal 
state obscures as much as it illuminates by consistently measuring actual states against an ideal version of what 
states should be” (15).  
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order is institutionalised in such areas where the central state has no a priori monopoly over 
the means of violence, in which the legitimacy and exercise of public authority is widely 
dispersed and in which processes of centralisation are constantly challenged.   
 
In states where sovereignty remains “fragmented” efforts to establish order, manage violence, 
define property rights and control access to resources are rarely the result of formal 
institutional frameworks (Lund 2011), but instead emerge from intense bargaining processes 
between an array of societal actors.  These bargaining processes are rooted in the politics of 
patrimonialism (De Waal 2009) and are focused on creating incentive structures that will 
encourage groups to pursue their aims through peaceful means rather than through violence.  
Understanding the role that such bargaining processes play in state-building and state 
breakdown necessitates  adopting a “coalitional analysis”, which focuses on the “shifting 
constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements that 
govern the exercise of different forms of authority within society”, and the role that resources 
play in shaping such coalitions (Di John 2008, 35).  
 
One of the most effective ways for central government actors to create effective coalitions 
may be to create what Douglass North et al. (2007 and 2009) have best described as a 
‘limited access order’.  In limited access orders, the political system manipulates the 
economic system and powerful non-state actors are given access to valuable political and 
economic rents in an attempt to gain their loyalty and encourage them to co-operate with each 
other rather than to fight.  By offering preferential access to these resources it becomes 
possible to form coalitions between actors which may otherwise have had little incentive to 
co-operate.  Political and economic structures are thus designed primarily to create the rents 
which “provide[...] the glue that holds the coalition together, enabling elite groups to make 
credible commitments to one another to support the regime and perform their functions” 
(North et al 2007, 8).  
 
 
Controlling access to resources plays an extremely important role in the creation of limited 
access orders.  This insight emphasizes the need for a far more complex and empirically 
grounded political economy of illicit economies in weak states that moves beyond the 
confines of the current literature on the ‘resource curse’.  Indeed, the illicit and lucrative 
nature of drug economies may make them highly predisposed to the creation of rents and thus 
a valuable means through which to establish limited access orders.  The illicit nature of the 
drug trade provides the state with an array of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ with which to coerce and 
co-opt private actors over which it would otherwise have little authority.  It provides the state 
with an opportunity to prosecute those involved in the drug trade, often in collaboration with 
international counter-narcotics agencies, and to legitimate repressive policies against groups 
involved in the trade, regardless of whether such policies are motivated by efforts to curtail 
narcotics production.  At the same time the state’s ability to protect and support groups 
involved in the trade by offering legal impunity, money laundering services and access to 
foreign markets via government-controlled transport networks and border checkpoints, can 
create a system of rents with which to build coalitions.  Where the state is able to utilise such 
incentives and threats “institutions of joint extraction” (Snyder 2006) may emerge between 
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state and non-state actors and illicit economies may actually become a means through which 
to establish political coalitions.   
 
Significant gaps, however, remain in the understanding of how limited access orders actually 
function.  The role that illicit economies play in establishing coalitions remains especially 
limited as do insights into the factors which determine the durability of political coalitions, 
the conditions that cause them to become fragile and collapse, the extent to which they 
strengthen the state or lead to a permanent dispersion of power and sovereignty, and finally 
the factors which determine why some limited access orders are able to promote social and 
economic development whilst others register few positive developments other than a 
temporary and partial reduction in levels of violence (Di John 2008, 31-2).  Furthermore, 
despite the fact that coercive power is widely dispersed in ‘limited access orders’, much of 
the literature on the political economy of state-building deals inadequately with issues of 
space and scale and as result offers only a partial and simplified analysis of how political 
coalitions emerge in sub-national spaces and how they are shaped by the specific dynamics of 
borderland regions.  Importantly, there is also limited engagement in how such bargaining 
processes are affected by concurrent processes of agrarian change in areas, like Burma’s 
borderlands, which are experiencing the increasingly intense impact of economic 
globalisation and are undergoing profound economic transformation as a result.6  Addressing 
these weaknesses offers a far more nuanced and insightful analysis into how coalitions are 
established and the important role that drugs play in their establishment in Shan State. 
 
Borderland dynamics 
Borderland regions provide a specific set of spatial dynamics which can, as in Burma’s case, 
decisively shape the construction of limited access orders.  ‘Borderlands’ embody spatial 
zones, defined here on the basis of two criteria.  Firstly, they are areas in which the ‘border 
effect’ of international boundaries impacts upon the mentalities and political and economic 
activities of their populations.  Secondly, drawing on the notion of “internal borderlands” 
(Goodhand 2008a, 228), they may also be defined as areas of weak state penetration.  They 
represent zones of hybridity in which the state often faces great difficulty in imposing its 
sovereignty, either through infrastructural or despotic power (Mann 1984).7  They have often 
been misleadingly projected as uncivilized, passive zones at the margins of state formation, 
subject to a linear and irreversible process of state encroachment and state-centring.  As Neil 
Brenner (1999) rightly argues, “territorialization is thus represented as a natural precondition 
                                                          
6 North et al’s (2009) analysis also overlooks the fact that decision-making may be a collective rather than 
individual process and may be affected by identities, emotions (such as pride, hatred, fear, shame and distrust), 
past decisions, belief systems, attachment to place, and the wider social networks in which actors are situated. 
Their contention that that coalitions only become stable when the “political interests of coalition members are 
balanced by their economic stakes in the existing order” (p.42) and are dependent on increasing the “rents from 
peace”, defined as “the difference in the returns their assets earn when they do not fight compared to the returns 
they earn when they do fight” (p.19), appears to partially reduce coalition members to rational utility 
maximisers.  In doing so their analysis is in danger of inadequately capturing the multiple factors which may 
determine the motivations and incentive structures underlying bargaining processes. 
7 Despotic power embodies the state’s abilities to impose forcible control ‘over society’ and represents the 
repressive capabilities of the state.  Infrastructural power represents the state’s power to penetrate society and 
implement its decisions.  It is seen to require a degree of cooperation and engagement between rulers and 
citizens with the state governing ‘through society’ (Mann 1984). 
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of social and political existence rather than being seen as a product of historically determinate 
strategies of parcelization, centralization, enclosure, and encaging” (p.49; for a further 
critique see: Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 78-102; Baud & Schendel 1997; Goodhand 2008a; 
Agnew 2008, 180; Newman and Paasi 1998, 196).  This has overlooked both the importance 
of borderlands to the construction of the modern state and the historical processes through 
which territorial sovereignty in these areas has emerged.  In doing so it has given inadequate 
attention to the role that the margins can play in shaping political developments at the centre 
(Goodhand 2008a).  This is especially problematic in the case of Burma, where the country’s 
drug-producing eastern borderlands have become an increasingly central part of the 
government’s state-building agenda over the past twenty years.   
 
Territorialising borderlands confers upon the state a number of opportunities.  Most 
importantly, the state’s ability to control the opening/closing of the border is an essential 
foundation for the construction of limited access orders. Without the power to enclose 
powerful non-state actors, the logic which underpins limited access orders cannot be 
operationalised since the state’s claims to offer preferential access to valuable political and 
economic rents may be subverted by non-state actors’ recourse to cross-border sources of 
patronage.  It is only through the creation of a territorially enclosed state that the incentive for 
non-state actors to co-operate with the centre is likely to become strong enough to enable the 
creation of durable political coalitions.  By managing the border the state therefore finds itself 
in a much stronger position to breakdown cross-border political networks which threaten to 
subvert its sovereignty and force borderland actors to look inwards.   
 
Borders themselves can be understood as valuable economic resources since the control and 
taxation of cross-border trade can strengthen the state’s financial position.  Controlling the 
border may also allow the state to benefit from inflows of transnational finance into 
borderland regions and may even transform these flows into economic rents with which to 
construct limited access orders.  Controlling the border also enables the state to construct and 
deconstruct certain social, political and economic boundaries by managing cross-border flows 
of people and goods and defining the rules for inclusion and exclusion in the political 
community.  This can promote the development of national identities in which citizens 
become defined by their relation to the territorial state and its institutions. 
 
Borderlands, however, also embody zones of insecurity, paranoia and endanger the 
construction of the modern state.  James C Scott’s conceptualization of borderlands as zones 
of hybridity and resistance provides the clearest insight into the challenges the state faces in 
these spaces (Scott 2009).  He argues that borderlands may commonly embody zones of 
refuge or “shatter zones” (p.325) which are best understood as anti-state spaces defined by 
activities and ideologies designed explicitly to repel the centripetal forces of the state’s 
‘civilising mission’.  Indeed, he argues that the very profile of borderland societies - low 
population density, extensive agriculture, linguistic and ethnic diversity - has developed in 
response to efforts by the state to control them.  
 
Finally, it is in the borderlands, where identities and affiliations straddle cartographic 
boundaries, that the state’s efforts to create a territorially defined nation state are revealed 
most starkly as illusory.  This may be especially true in post-colonial late developing 
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countries where “most states are ‘younger’ than the societies they purport to administer and 
the demarcation of borders preceded nation-building” (Goodhand 2008a, 228).  It is within the 
borderlands that various political geographies are most clearly in conflict.  To adapt Arjun 
Appadurai’s (2001) terminology, it is in the borderlands that the state’s efforts to 
operationalise “trait geographies”, best defined as the attempt to affix specific attributes to a 
given space (national identities, language, relations to the state), come up most sharply against 
the “process geographies” of many societies, in which human organization is the result of 
“various kinds of action, interaction, and motion - trade, travel, pilgrimage, warfare, 
proselytization, colonization, exile, and the like” (7-8), none of which fit easily within the 
spatial container of the state.   
 
The borderlands thus embody a specific set of dynamics around the generation of capital, the 
means of coercion, and the legitimization of state power, which are integral to processes of 
state formation (Tilly 1990; see Table 1).  The state’s management of the borderlands is 
therefore a fundamentally important dynamic of state formation and provides an important 
entry point for analyzing the political processes shaping Burma’s drug-producing regions. 
  
Table 1: Borderlands as zones of opportunity and risk 
 Opportunity Risk 
Capital 
Strengthening of the state’s 
economic position through:  
- Taxation of cross-border 
trade. 
- Extraction, or taxation of 
extraction of resources 
within the borderlands. 
- Taxation of borderland 
populations. 
- Management of 
transnational capital. 
Taxation of revenue from 
cross-border trade, from 
resources in the borderlands 
and from inflows of 
transnational capital may 
afford non-state actors 
economic autonomy from the 
state.  This may lead to the 
breakdown of limited access 
orders and may fund violent 
opposition to the state. 
 
Coercion 
The ability to open/close the 
border is an important 
foundation for establishing a 
limited access order by 
forcing force non-state actors 
to engage with the centre.   
Cross-border networks of 
patronage and access to 
alternative power centres 
break down the logic of the 
limited access order. This 
strengthens the bargaining 
position of borderland actors 
vis-à-vis the state. 
Legitimation 
Control of the borderlands 
allows the state to provide 
services and welfare and to 
“set the limits of acceptable 
political, economic and 
social behavior” (Taylor, 
Social identities that 
transcend the territorial state 
undermine the notion of the 
state as the container of 
society; The porosity of 
borderlands may encourage 
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2008, p.11); It allows the 
state to define social 
boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion and to 
build national identities, in 
which citizens are defined by 
their relation to the territorial 
state and its institutions. 
multiple frameworks of self-
identity, leading to the 
rejection of nation-building 
strategies and undermining 
the state’s efforts to establish 
homogeneity.  
 
 
Processes of economic transformation 
State-building processes in Burma’s eastern borderlands have been further complicated by 
the expansion of capitalist market relations and the rapid growth of international trade and 
transnational capital flows over the past twenty years.  The increased demand and 
competition for land and resources have intensified processes of commoditization, best 
defined as the “transformation of people and ‘nature’ into marketable products” in which 
“everything comes to acquire a price and monetary form” (Nevins and Lee Peluso 2008, 3, 
14-15).  Across Southeast Asia these processes are not new. Commoditization has a long 
history dating back to pre-colonial trade networks that traversed the region and intensifying 
through the colonial period.  However, over the past thirty years increased levels of 
technology, science and infrastructure, the huge growth in demand for resources, 
predominantly from China, and the development of increasingly strong post-colonial states 
that have been able to support, and in some cases lead, processes of enclosure and primitive 
accumulation, have meant that the impact of commoditization has been especially 
transformative. The fact that Burma’s drug-producing regions contain a vast array of other 
highly coveted natural resources has meant that the impact of these processes has been 
particularly profound. 
 
Understanding the impact of commoditization requires moving beyond the “civilizing frontier 
rhetoric” (Cramer and Richards 2011, 289), in which commoditization is commonly 
portrayed as an inherently positive foundation for economic development conducted upon 
pre-modern spaces.  The commoditization of space is not the result of a gradual extension of 
property right structures and market relations into wild, previously ungoverned frontier zones 
but instead entails complex processes of agrarian change involving the destruction of existing 
social and economic structures in order to create new economic orders (Peluso and Lund 
2011, 668).   Commoditization is thus underwritten by the ‘de’territorialization and 
‘re’territorialization of rural spaces; it is founded upon “rescaling access to the commons, 
and…institutionalizing new processes of inclusion and exclusion in rural political 
economies” (Barney 2008, 106).  It involves the destruction of existing land uses, property 
rights structures and social relations and the establishment and entrenchment of new property 
right regimes.  The inherent inequality and injustice underpinning the primitive accumulation 
of capital, has meant that such processes are invariably heavily contested and has ensured that 
extreme violence has often been a means with which to both  “open up” areas and 
“discipline” populations, and to try to counteract these processes (Nevins and Peluso 2008, 
3). 
Developing an analytical framework which assesses the dynamics of state consolidation and 
economic transformation within borderland spaces provides the basis for understanding the 
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geographically and historically specific trajectory of state consolidation in Burma over the 
past twenty years.  It offers insights into the alignment of the interests of the state and of 
capital in pursuing spatial strategies focused on producing manageable territory in the 
country’s borderlands.  Such an analysis also emphasizes how such territorial control cannot 
be taken as pre-given or abstract form of the state but is determined by ongoing processes and 
strategies which remain highly contested (Massey 2009, 17; Brenner and Elden 2009).  
 
Coercion, countermovement and brokerage: Re-considering the political economy of 
drugs  
The profound political, economic and socially dislocating developments in Burma’s 
borderlands, over which the drug trade has become a palimpsest, have, however, rarely 
featured in policy analysis.  Counter-narcotics strategies have instead tended to assume that 
strengthening the capacity of the state and promoting alternative forms of economic 
development will automatically lead to a reduction in drug production, rather than 
considering how state-building strategies and economic transitions may actually interact with 
and re-shape the drug trade.  Overcoming these inherent analytical weaknesses requires 
adopting an alternative approach, which engages with how the drug trade is both shaped by 
and continues to shape the region’s political and economic trajectories and how it has become 
embedded within the multiple and overlapping processes of coercion, counter-movement and 
brokerage that surround state-building strategies and processes of economic transformation. 
 
Coercion 
Henri LeFebvre’s ([1974], 1991) assertion that the modern state is a form of “violence 
directed towards a space” (280), designed to create a unified and homogenous society within 
a space that “has nothing homogenous about it” (308) captures the essence of how state 
territorialisation – the creation of state-controlled spaces – is a political construct and one 
prone to violent conflict.  The drive for homogenization is founded upon the state’s desire to 
make societies and cultures more easily ‘legible’ and ‘governable’, in order to control 
populations and impose regularised systems of taxation and land ownership (Scott 1998).  By 
establishing territorial control the state determines access to and control over land and 
resources, “produc[ing] and maintain[ing] power relations among environmental subjects and 
between subjects and authorities”, and as a result is likely to be heavily contested (Peluso and 
Lund 2011, 673).  The use of violent coercion is often central to the processes in which such 
power relations are imposed and rejected (Giustozzi 2011; Cramer 2006).   
 
Within Shan State, drug economies have clearly been co-opted to finance the coercive 
practices which underpin state-building and economic change.  Pervasive militarisation of the 
borderland regions has become instrumental to the state’s renewed efforts to extend its 
territorial control.   This policy of increased militarisation has, however, only been partly 
financed by the central government.  The Army has instead been required to ‘live off the 
land’, a policy which became explicit in 1997 when the government’s War Office informed 
the Army’s twelve Regional Commanders that troops “were to meet their basic logistical 
needs locally, rather than rely on the central supply system” (Selth 2002, 136; Callahan 
2007b, 46).  The ability of the state to pursue “coercion-intensive” forms of state 
consolidation (Tilly 1990) has thus been directly reliant upon the Army’s ability to generate 
revenues locally.  In Shan State, the taxation of opium cultivation and trafficking appears to 
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have become an important way in which to fund this decentralized system of military 
financing, creating a system whereby whilst the central government continues to work with 
the UNODC in promoting counter-narcotic strategies, at the sub-national level, army 
personnel continue to use the drug trade as means through which to finance their activities in 
the borderlands (PWO 2010, 2011; SHAN 2003, 2005; TNI 2009b, 2012). 
 
As part of its efforts to develop a stronger military presence in the borderland regions the 
army has also sought to promote the development large of numbers of militia groups.  The 
expansion of militias, nominally aligned to Army, is one of the most significant but under-
analysed developments in Shan State, with one informant estimating that in 2010 in Northern 
Shan State alone in there were approximately four hundred militias with over eight thousand 
men and with reserves of more than sixteen thousand men.8  Militia groups provide a cost-
effective way for the Army to increase its manpower, whilst apparently providing an 
expendable frontline for the Army in its ongoing offensives against insurgent groups and in 
its efforts to confiscate land and securitise areas ear-marked for large-scale development 
projects.  For example, in the areas surrounding the site of the hydropower Shweli Dam 1, in 
Namkham Township, Northern Shan State, state-backed militia groups (such as the Mantong 
and Pansay militias) appear to have played an important part in confiscating land, relocating 
an estimated fifteen thousand villagers and securitising the dam site (PYNG 2007; TSYO 
2011). It is a very similar story around other development sites in Shan state, such as the 
Upper Thanlwin, Tasang and Upper Paugluang Dams (BEWG 2012; SWAN 2010; TNI 
2012). The expansion of militia groups also adheres to the Army’s ‘divide and rule’ 
strategies, pitting locally-formed militias against insurgent groups operating in the same area, 
weakening the unity of any form of ethnicity/identity-based opposition to the state.  
 
In Shan State the Army has clearly sought to institutionalise order through the creation of 
decentralised, sub-national forms of limited access orders, in which promises of protection, 
access to resources, and control over checkpoints and border gates are used to maintain the 
loyalty of these militia groups.  Drug revenues remain fundamentally important in lubricating 
these relationships and it seems clear that ‘while the regime is seeking to paint its 
manoeuvres against the ceasefire groups as a crusade against drugs, it is simultaneously 
building up security units that are just as notorious for drug production’ (PWO 2006, 10). 
This analysis is corroborated by the fact that in the November 2010 general election at least 
four militia leaders notorious for their involvement in the drugs trade were elected in Shan 
State North as representatives of the government-backed Union Solidarity and Development 
Party (USDP) (Hseng Khio Fah 2010; SHAN 2011).     
   
Counter-movement 
Whilst liberal state-building policy has emphasised the dangers posed by fragile states, it is 
equally true that processes of state-building, involving the consolidation of the means of 
violence and extraction, pose profound risks and challenges to many social groups who may 
view state encroachment as a greater threat than the absence of formal state institutions.  As 
Christopher Clapham (2004) powerfully argues: 
 
                                                          
8 Interview with a Burmese researcher, Chiang Mai, 21st June 2011 
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From the viewpoint of the indigenous peoples, on whom states were imposed, 
this process can readily be seen to have brought with it very significant costs, in 
social, economic, and political terms. The state-centred and state-supporting 
literature of political science has been so heavily concerned with emphasizing the 
benefits of statehood that the other side of the account has gone almost unnoticed 
(…). The social costs of statehood, and particularly of modern statehood, include 
the sacrifice of identities and structures that are inimical to the hierarchies of 
control that states seek to impose” (Clapham 2004, 86, cited in Boege et al 2008, 
5-6)    
 
The highly lucrative nature of the drug trade, the fact that the state is rarely able to prevent 
extraction or impose a monopoly over the means of extraction, and the fact that well-
established trade networks connect remote areas to external markets, has ensured that drugs 
continue to offer a valuable source of revenue for those opposing  state encroachment and the 
processes of enclosure and primitive accumulation underpinning agrarian transitions. Most 
obviously, drugs have provided revenues for armed insurgency groups in Shan State fighting 
against the government.  Although the highly politicized nature of involvement in the drug 
trade has led many groups to publicly distance themselves from involvement in an attempt to 
avoid de-legitimising their fight against the government, taxation on drug cultivation and 
trafficking continue to provide an important revenue stream for opposition groups (TNI 2012, 
14-16).  As a valuable cash crop that can be grown in remote areas drugs also offer an 
opportunity for more localised forms of “surreptitious resistance” (Scott 1990, 200), 
seemingly offering households a way of evading the centripetal forces of processes of state 
territorialisation, to escape military aggression and forced relocation programmes, and to 
continue to survive in areas where the growth of commercial agriculture has reduced land 
tenure security and limited the scope for more extensive forms of agriculture.      
 
Brokerage 
Attempts to minimize both the need to employ violent coercion and the threat of inciting 
counter-movements, means the state may commonly look to work through powerful local 
actors who prove themselves able to manage the interface between the central state and their 
communities in ways which allow the state to “reach down” into the ‘peripheries’ (Wolf  
1956, 1065).  Although poorly understood, it is through such brokerage that the state may 
first find a foothold in areas where its authority has traditionally been subservient to that of 
powerful local actors.  Within drug-producing regions the drug trade has invariably become 
an important foundation of local power structures, in which powerful actors manage taxation 
networks, trade routes, access to transnational finance, and coercive power. This places such 
actors at the “synapses” (Wolf 1956, 1071) between local and central networks of power, 
enabling them to act as brokers, benefitting from state patronage whilst looking to translate 
the state’s penetration into borderland regions in ways which preserve their own interests.  
This is certainly the case in Burma where the drug trade has become a particularly important 
channel through which the modalities of interaction between these various social scales are 
experienced and has thus become an important arena in which processes of state-building and 
economic transformation are negotiated.   
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Since the early 1990s the government and the army have sought to increase the opportunity 
costs of violence and encourage co-operation by offering ceasefire groups and militias in 
Shan State preferential access to the drug economy in return for a cessation of hostilities and 
a promise to sever all ties with groups still in opposition.  Over the past twenty years the state 
has sought to create a system of rents within the drug economy through numerous 
mechanisms. Most obvious has been the state’s willingness to offer legal impunity to groups 
involved in the drugs trade following their signing of ceasefire agreements. This was shown 
most clearly in early 2005 following the indictment of eight leaders of the UWSA by a 
Brooklyn federal grand jury in the United States (Kramer 2007, 54). The state’s refusal to 
arrest any of those charged or to end its intimate business links with the corporations they 
controlled demonstrated the level of protection the government was willing to offer to former 
insurgent groups who had ‘returned to the legal fold’. Of greater importance has been the 
state’s readiness to offer money-laundering services. Since 1989 state-controlled banks have 
accepted deposits of dubious origin without question, subject to a ‘whitening tax’ initially 
levied at 40 per cent and later reduced to 25 per cent (Lintner and Black 2009, 122; Lintner 
2000, 187).  In return for greater co-operation and support, state actors, at both the regional 
and national level, have also offered business permits and government contracts to 
organisations known to be involved in the drugs trade, providing a legitimate front through 
which they are then able invest income derived illegally. (see Meehan 2011, 389-99 for a 
more detailed discussion of this point.)  
 
Over the past twenty years these strategies have greatly aided the state’s efforts to gain 
greater control over the means of violence in Shan State.  The incentives offered by the state 
have converted many former rebel groups into proxy state actors, enabling the Burmese 
Army to concentrate its forces against those groups that have refused to enter into ceasefire 
agreements, often supported by former insurgent armies.  The deals brokered between the 
state and powerful local actors have also strengthened the state’s economic position in a 
number of ways. Firstly, by offering legal impunity, money-laundering services and business 
opportunities the state has been able to effectively direct a far greater proportion of drug 
revenue inwards. This ‘stemming of capital flight’ and the channelling of revenue into the 
legal economy has been one of the most important but least reported changes to Burma’s 
political economy over the last two decades (Snyder 2006, 961; Lintner 1998).  Secondly, 
through these bargaining processes the state has gained far greater control over both cross-
border trade with China and Thailand and the exploitation of natural resources in Shan State.  
 
Shan State’s growing integration into regional markets offers hugely lucrative opportunities 
to incorporate the area’s abundant natural resources into global commodity chains.  Within 
this environment the drug trade appears to have been viewed as the quickest way to 
accumulate large amounts of capital, providing the financial means with which to invest in 
new, legal, economic opportunities.9  This was especially apparent in the early 1990s 
                                                          
9 These processes are not new.  Carl Trocki’s (1999) study of the role of opium in Empire-building in Asia 
powerfully emphasizes the centrality of illicit economies to processes of capital accumulation and class 
formation which have underpinned both the rise of capitalism and the creation of the modern state (xiv).   
Opium, he argues, served both to “entrap labour forces” through the monetarization of subsistence lifestyles, 
whilst also generating vast amounts of surplus wealth which “fed the institutions that accumulated it”, namely 
the banking and financial sectors, insurance and infrastructural developments (173).    
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following the SLORC’s efforts to reform the dysfunctional state-controlled economy. In an 
attempt to redress decades of stalled growth the government launched a partial liberalisation 
of the country’s economy, enabling the emergence of a small number of private banks and the 
development of a small private industrial sector, mostly focused on the construction industry 
and import/export enterprises (Turnell 2002; Turnell 2009, 256-296).10 
 
The Hong Pang Group, now one of Burma’s largest conglomerates with over thirty 
subsidiaries, offers an insightful example (Lintner and Black 2009, 117-8).  It is owned by 
Wei Xuegang (Wei Hseuh-Kang), a leading figure in the UWSA and formerly the General 
Commander of its Southern Command, whose troops have launched joint offensives with the 
Burmese Army against the SSA-S (Ko Lin Chin 2009, 140). A former associate of the late 
Khun Sa, Burma’s most notorious drug-lord (McCoy 1999), Wei is wanted in both the United 
States and Thailand on drug-trafficking charges and is “believed to be the kingpin of Burma’s 
methamphetamine business” (Ko Lin Chin 2009, 140).  Described as a “real friend” in 2001 
by Prime Minister General Thein Sein, then in charge of the Burma Army’s Triangle 
Command (Lintner & Black, p.98), Wei came to enjoy close links with the government in the 
1990s (Meehan 2011, 392).  The Hong Pang Group has gained permits for large scale logging 
and commercial agriculture projects in Shan State as well as being contracted to build a 
highway between Tachilek and Kengtung.  It has also been involved in deforestation and 
infrastructure development around numerous dam sites across Shan State, notably the Tasang 
Dam on the Salween River (Shan Sapawa Environmental Organisation 2009, 14), all of 
which have led the company to be described as “the biggest money-laundering operation in 
South-east Asia today” (Lintner and Black 2009, 117).  The case of the Hong Pang Group is 
by no means unique and many of Burma’s largest corporations appear to have had roots in 
the country’s shadow economy (For a more detailed analysis see Meehan 2011, 392-5; also 
ALTSEAN-Burma 2004, 65-80, 113-15; Irrawaddy 2001; Maung Aye 2011; Snyder 2006).   
 
Thus, whilst the complex matrix of deals brokered between the government and powerful 
local actors has enabled the state far greater penetration of the borderlands, it has also 
provided local actors with opportunities to consolidate and legitimize their wealth by 
investing in the legal economy and seeking political office.  These processes of 
“diversification” and “graduation” (Goodhand and Mansfield 2010, 26) have served both to 
strengthen the political coalitions underpinning limited access orders, whilst the economic 
opportunities they confer have provided further impetus to generate income through the drug 
trade.     
 
It should be noted, however, that the long-term political outcomes of these processes of 
brokerage still remain unclear. On the one hand, Kevin Woods (2011a) has powerfully 
argued that by directing transnational finance into resource-rich upland areas in Kachin State, 
the Burmese government has been able to establish military-private partnerships which have 
spearheaded both processes of primitive accumulation and increased state legibility, thus 
converting the state’s de jure sovereignty into de facto control.  In these militarized 
                                                          
10 A hypothesis still to be tested is whether the a direct link can be drawn between the SLORC’s partial 
liberalisation of the economy, especially its decision to allow the development of a small private banking sector, 
and the huge spike in drug production in the 1990s. 
This is the Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Ashgate in Oliver Charnoz, Virginie 
Diaz Pedregal and Alan L. Kolata (eds). Local Politics, Global Impacts: Steps to a Multi-Disciplinary 
Analysis of Scales (Global Governance Series), 2015: https://www.routledge.com/Local-Politics-
Global-Impacts-Steps-to-a-Multi-disciplinary-Analysis/Charnoz-Pedregal/p/book/9781472460509  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25341/  
 
 
18 
 
borderland areas, where access to land and resources remains highly contested, national and 
transnational corporations have sought to promote functioning state institutions, viewing 
these as the most viable way to “fix, regulate and expand capitalist spaces” (p.751) in which 
they increasingly look to the state to uphold and enforce their property ‘rights’.  In contrast, 
however, MacLean’s (2008) study on Burma’s “extractive enclaves”, offers a far more 
ambiguous and paradoxical analysis. It argues that whilst brokerage strategies have provided 
the state with greater access to the country’s borderland regions, they have also led to the 
diffusion of power into local networks, over which the state has found it increasingly difficult 
to centralize any form of control.  Brokerage has created complex and overlapping networks 
of “Tatmadaw [army] field battalions, cease-fire groups, state-owned enterprises, and local 
entrepreneurs”, creating “mosaics of territorial control” (Hardin 2002, ii), over which the 
state has found it increasingly difficult to consolidate its control over commodities and 
populations (MacLean 2008, 141). 
 
Scaling up: How engaging with local politics offers alternative perspectives on global 
counter-narcotics strategies 
This study has demonstrated the inextricable links between the drugs trade and the local 
political and economic context in Burma’s eastern borderlands within which it operates. It 
argues that global counter-narcotics strategies must begin with a proper conceptualisation of 
how the state actually functions at the local level and an understanding of the spatial 
dimensions of state power, which recognises the ways in which drug-producing borderland 
regions may become fundamentally important to processes of state consolidation.  The 
symbiotic relationship that is perceived to exist between counter-narcotics strategies, peace-
building and state-building, in which strict law enforcement and drug eradication is viewed as 
a means by which to target the revenue of ‘greedy’ rebels and in doing so strengthen 
government institutions in fragile states, also needs to be questioned (Goodhand and 
Mansfield 2010, 35).  Instead, greater emphasis must be given to the ways in which illicit 
economies can become embedded in the very processes of state-building and economic 
‘development’, which it is often assumed will lead to a reduction in drug production.  This 
paper also demonstrates how the entrance of international actors and transnational capital 
flows into source regions may intensify social conflict in ways that re-shape the political 
economy of drugs and continue to drive production. 
  
The impact of China’s Opium Substitution programme in Northern Burma provides a 
worrying example of how such oversights can lead to severe unintended consequences.  In an 
attempt to reduce the amount of heroin crossing the border the Chinese government launched 
the Opium Replacement Fund in 2006, offering subsidies, tax waivers and import quotas to 
Chinese companies which established alternative development enterprises in North-eastern 
Burma. The fund has provided impetus to the development of commercial agriculture, 
especially rubber, often through public-private partnerships with the Burmese government 
(TNI 2012).  This ‘frontier capitalism’ has been accompanied by violent land grabs, forced 
relocation of borderland populations, extensive deforestation, and a significant rise in drug 
production (TNI 2012, 4,13-14; Woods 2011b). Increased opium cultivation appears to have 
become an increasingly important livelihood survival strategy for smallholders faced with the 
prospect of heightened land tenure and food insecurity (TNI 2010, 2).  Furthermore, the 
revenues derived from the drug trade have seemingly been incorporated into the ongoing 
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processes of coercion, countermovement and brokerage surrounding attempts to integrate 
Burma’s border regions into regional commodity markets, creating an environment in which 
the economic ‘reforms’ designed to reduce opium cultivation have become an important 
factor in accounting for the increase in drug production since 2006.  
 
The complex relationship between drugs and the politics of state-building and economic 
transformation in Burma’s eastern borderlands raises the question of whether a counter-
narcotics strategy designed at the global level can ever be successful.  Although providing an 
adequate answer to this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, the research presented 
here emphasizes the ways in which a scalar analysis offers insights into why, and at which 
level, global strategies often fail, by understanding how they become ‘translated’ in local 
contexts.  In particular, this study has sought to demonstrate that whilst the challenges posed 
by the illicit drugs trade may be experienced on a global scale, they can rarely be properly 
understood and addressed solely at the global level. Such an approach invariably encourages 
reified, depoliticized, institutionalist responses to problems which are inherently political.   
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